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In August 2005, an investment manager of a hedge fund is considering purchasing an equity interest in a start-up biotechnology firm, Arcadian Microarray Technologies, Inc. The asking price is $40 million for a 60 percent equity interest. Managers of the firm are optimistic about the firm's future performance; the investment manager is more conservative in his expectations. He calls on the help of an analyst with her firm to fashion a counterproposal to Arcadian's management. The tasks for the student are to apply the concept of terminal value, interpret completed analyses and data, and derive implications of different terminal-value assumptions in an effort to recommend a counterproposal. Very little numerical figure-work is required of the student.

In January 1996, an investment manager of a hedge fund is considering purchasing an equity interest in a start-up biotechnology firm, Rocky Mountain Advanced Genome (RMAG). The asking price is $46 million for a 90% equity interest. Although managers of the firm are optimistic about its future performance, the investment manager is more conservative in her expectations. She asks an analyst to fashion a counterproposal for RMAG's management. The tasks for the student are to apply the concept of terminal value, interpret completed analyses and data, and derive implications of different terminal value assumptions in an effort to recommend a counterproposal. Little computation is required of the student. The main objective of the case is to survey many conceptual and practical challenges associated with estimating a firm's terminal value. Issues addressed include the concept of terminal value; the materiality of the terminal-value assumption; the varieties of terminal-value estimators and their strengths and weaknesses; taxation of terminal values; when to assume liquidation versus going-concern terminal values; choosing a forecast horizon at which to estimate a terminal value; the constant growth valuation model, its derivation, limiting assumptions of constant growth to infinity, and WACC > g; use of the Fisher Formula as a foundation for estimating growth rate to infinity; and using a variety of estimates to “triangulate” in on a terminal value.

A new CEO from outside the firm takes over following the sudden death of the former CEO. Included in the new CEO's inbox are pressing decisions concerning (1) the firm's financing needs, (2) capital equipment, and (3) a general assessment of the firm's financial performance. The task for the student is to analyze these issues and recommend action.

In mid-1992, Christine Olsen, the chief financial officer (CFO) of this large CAD/CAM equipment manufacturer, must decide on the magnitude of the firm's dividend payout. A subsidiary question is whether the firm should embark on a campaign of corporate-image advertising and change its corporate name to reflect its new outlook. The case serves as an omnibus review of the many practical aspects of the dividend decision, including (1) signaling effects, (2) clientele effects, and (3) finance and investment implications of increasing dividend payout.

This case may be taught singly or used as a merger-negotiation exercise with “Chrysler Corporation: Negotiations between Daimler and Chrysler” (UVA-F-1240). Set in February 1998, the case places students in the position of negotiators for the company; their task is to value both firms, assess the potential earnings dilution of a combination, and negotiate a detailed agreement with their counterpart. The case can be used to explore such interesting negotiation issues as determination of a share-exchange ratio, treatment of major stockholders, and structuring a deal. Also, the case and exercise can be used to spark a discussion of acquisition in comparison with strategic alliance, or other less formal models of combination.

This case may be taught singly or used as a merger-negotiation exercise with “Daimler-Benz A. G.: Negotiations between Daimler and Chrysler” (UVA-F-1241). Set in February 1998, the case places students in the position of negotiators for the company; their task is to value both firms, assess the potential earnings dilution of a combination, and negotiate a detailed agreement with their counterpart. The case can be used to explore such interesting negotiation issues as determination of a share-exchange ratio, treatment of major stockholders, and structuring a deal. Also, the case and exercise can be used to spark a discussion of acquisition in comparison with strategic alliance, or other less formal models of combination.

In early 2002, an analyst, Tom Baumann, must propose terms for leasing one of his company's advanced factory-automation systems to a major customer. From the lessor's standpoint, the challenge is simply to design an annuity stream that yields a present value equal to, or greater than, the value of the asset being leased. Certain factors, however, serve to complicate the analysis. The tax exposure and debt rating of the customer are uncertain, leaving the analyst to estimate the impact of alternative lease terms under different tax and interest-rate assumptions. Also, the customer is considering leasing competing systems from companies in Germany and Japan; these competing proposals limit Primus's flexibility in tailoring its proposal. In short, the student's task is to design lease terms that exploit the lessee's tax and interest-rate exposure within constraints set by competitive terms.

In July 2001, a new CEO joins this small manufacturer of CD-ROMs and DVDs to discover that the firm is in the midst of a financial crisis, induced by rapid growth. The CEO asks an analyst for help with five tasks: (1) review historical performance of the firm; (2) forecast financing requirements for the next two years; (3) exercise the forecasting model to identify “key driver” assumptions; (4) estimate Star River's weighted average cost of capital; and (5) analyze a proposed investment in a packaging machine. The analyst must offer insights and recommendations based on the work. The aim of the case is to exercise students’ abilities in financial forecasting and analysis and in the analysis of capital projects. Generally, the case offers a good omnibus review of foundational tools and concepts.

On March 1, 2001, Jessica Gallinelli, managing director of Bancroft Capital Management, heard surprising and somewhat disturbing news about the proposed bid by General Electric Company (GE) for Honeywell International Inc. Despite recent public assurances about the deal from GE's chairman and chief executive officer (CEO), John F. “Jack” Welch Jr., the antitrust regulatory authority of the European Commission (EC) announced it had initiated a review of the proposed merger. Gallinelli, whose fund owned a large stake in Honeywell, considered this major development and wondered whether Bancroft should alter its investment. Immediately, Gallinelli instructed her associate to provide background material on the merger, an assessment of the probability the merger would be approved by antitrust regulators in the U.S. and Europe, and valuation analyses to assist Gallinelli in assessing Bancroft's investment in Honeywell. She would need to decide quickly whether to hold or sell her fund's 10 million shares in Honeywell and short position of 10 million shares in GE. As a risk arbitrageur, she thought prices would respond rapidly to the EC's announcement. She remembered Jack Welch's confidence of five months earlier that this was the “cleanest deal you'll ever see,” and she wondered whether that was still the case.

In January 1996, the chief financial officer must fashion a response to a raider who claims that a major business segment of the company should be sold because it is not earning a satisfactory rate of return (ROR). The case recounts the debate within the company over the use of a single hurdle rate to evaluate all segments of the company versus a risk-adjusted hurdle rate system. The students’ tasks are to resolve the debate, estimate weighted-average costs of capital (WACC) for the two business segments, and respond to the raider. Because the case was prepared to serve as part of an introduction to estimating investors’ required rates of return, it would best follow one or two class sessions introducing techniques for estimating WACC. Although the numerical calculations required are light, some of the subtleties about the use of risk-adjusted hurdle rates will require time for the novice to absorb. The case can be used to pursue a variety of teaching objectives, including (1) extending risk return (i.e., mean variance) analysis to corporate finance; (2) surveying classic arguments for and against the use of risk-adjusted hurdle rate systems; (3) assessing the assumptions and limitations of risk-adjusted hurdle rate systems; (4) exercising the estimation of segment WACCs; and (5) considering possible organizational barriers to the implementation of risk-adjusted hurdle rates.